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Parties 
All parties are listed in the caption. 
The caption on the pleadings in the district court 
contains a reference to "employees"; however, these individuals 
did not enter an appearance and are not parties to this 
action. These employees assigned their wages to the Industrial 
Commission and the Industrial Commission should be, and is, the 
sole appellant. 
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STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
I, Is a 11 owner-developer of ] and , who coi 11racted 
with a builder for the construction of an improvement on his 
land, liable, under Section 34-28-8, Utah Code 1985-1986, for 
the wages of tl xe bui 1 der "*' s eixipl oyees if the 1:: i ill der d i d not pay 
the wages? 
II. Does an appellant from an Industrial Commission 
order, pursuant tc Secti on 34-28-9 ( 3 ) , U1 .al Cc >de 1985-1986, 
need to file the $100.00 cost bond described in Rule 73(k) 
U.R.C.P. to perfect the appeal? 
DISPOSITIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, 
STATUTES, ORDINANCES, RULES AND REGULATIONS 
Section 34-28-8, Utah Code 1985-1986: 
Whenever any person shall contract with 
another for the performance of work, 
then it shall be the duty of such 
person to provide in the contract that 
all wages earned pursuant to the 
contract shall be paid in accordance 
with the provisions of this chapter, 
and in the event that any wages earned 
under the contract shall not be paid as 
required in this act, such person shall 
be civilly liable for all wages for 
work performed under such contract in 
the same manner as if the employees 
entitled to such wages were directly 
employed by such person. 
Rule 73(k) U.R.C.P.: 
At the time of filing the notice of 
appeal, the appellant shall file with 
such notice a bond for costs on appeal 
in accordance with the provisions of 
Rule 73(c), except that the amount of 
such bond shall be $100.00. The 
-1-
appellant may likewise, under the 
conditions of Rule 62 and in accordance 
with the provisions of Rule 73, 
relating to appeals to the Supreme 
Court, obtain a stay of execution 
pending an appeal, provided, that any 
exception to the appellant's sureties 
shall be made in the district court to 
which the appeal is taken and 
justification of such sureties shall be 
before the clerk or a judge of such 
court. 
Rule 81(d) U.R.C.P.: 
These rules shall apply to the practice 
and procedure in appealing from or 
obtaining a r€>view of any order, ruling 
or other action of an administrative 
board or agency, except in so far as 
the specific statutory procedure in 
connection with any such appeal or 
review is in conflict or inconsistent 
with these Rules, 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case 
This is an action to collect unpaid wages. 
B. Previous Proceedings 
This case originated when several laborers, who had 
worked on a condominium project at Deer Valley, went to the 
Industrial Commission and complained that they had not been 
paid their wages. The Industrial Commission held 
administrative hearings and, in three separate orders, found in 
favor of the employees and against both the employer, T & K 
Steel, Inc., and the land own€>r-developer, RDG. 
RDG attempted to appeal the orders of the Industrial 
Commission to the district court by filing notices of appeal 
and petitions for trial de novo (R. 2-11). 
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In the district court, the Industrial Commission filed 
answers (R 52-53A) , nioti 01 is (R. 54-55 ) to dismiss the appeals 
for failure to file cost bonds, and motions (R 12-51) for 
partial summary judgment. RDG filed motions (R. 75-76) for 
summary judgment Tin- Hiree cases were consolidated into one 
case, district court number C85-848, and all references to the 
record (R.) are to that case. 
The di stri ct co 1 11: t judge granted RDG's Motion For 
Summary Judgment and denied the Industrial Commission's Motion 
to Dismiss and its Motion For Partial Summary Judgment. 
( - - ) . 
Statement of Relevant Facts 
The respondent, RDG, is a limited partnership. The 
purpose of tb~- - - > \ner\ship i:.-. stated s< \rtificate of 
limited partnership filed with the Salt Lake County Clerk 
(R. 86-94): 
The purpose of the Partnership and the 
character of its business is to 
acquire, hold, develop, operate, and 
manage certain real property 
(hereinafter the "Property") situated 
in Park City, Summit County, State of 
Utah, and more particularly described 
in Exhibit "A" attached hereto and by 
this reference made a part hereof." 
(R. 87). Emphasis added. 
RDG entered into a written contract (R. 16-51) with a 
building contractor, T & K Steel, Inc., to construct 27 
condomi n 3 units knowi 1 as Phase il or The Pinnacle at Deer 
Valley (R. . «• ) on RDG's land for $5,179,341.00 (R. 17). 
T & K Steel, Inc. commenced construction, however, 
before:: • completion of the project, RDG and T & K Steel, Inc. 
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entered into another written agreement terminating their 
contractual relationship. (R. 3 paragraph 3). But while RDG 
and T & K Steel, Inc. had settled the dispute between 
themselves, 63 employees of T & K Steel, Inc.f who had labored 
on the condominium project, had not been paid their wages. In 
the words of RDG: "All amounts owed by RDG to T & K Steel, 
Inc. under the contract were paid in full on or before December 
7, 1984, the date the contract was terminated. Unfortunately, 
it appears that T & K Steel did not fully pay its employees for 
wages earned on the condominium project." (R. 80 lines 1-4). 
These employees assigned their rights to the unpaid 
wages to the Industrial Commission of Utah pursuant to Section 
34-28-13, Utah Code 1985-1986, (R. 9). The Industrial 
Commission, in three separate orders, found RDG and T & K 
Steel, Inc. jointly and severally liable for the unpaid wages 
of the 63 employees totaling $22,401.33. The Industrial 
Commission found RDG liable under the provisions of Section 
34-28-8, Utah Code 1985-1986, (R. 10). RDG filed a notice of 
appeal and petition for trial de novo (R. 2-5). The Industrial 
Commission filed an answer (R. 52) and admitted every 
allegation contained in RDG's Petition For Trial De Novo with 
the exception of paragraph 8, which alleged the Industrial 
Commission erred when it found RDG liable under Section 
34-28-8, Utah Code, 1985-1986. The only additional facts that 
were presented to the court were those contained in RDG's 
Certificate of Limited Partnership (R. 86-94). 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The Industrial Commission respectfully submits that 
the intent of the legislatures of 1937, 1941, and 1969, when 
they enacted Section 34-28-8 and its earlier versions, was to 
protect employees such as those employed by T & K Steel, Inc. 
and working on RDG's condominiums at Deer Valley. The purpose 
of the entire Labor Code is to protect the laborer. Chapter 28 
of Title 34 contains several provisions which encourage the 
prompt and complete payment of wages. Among those provisions 
is Section 8, it makes wages an obligation that goes beyond the 
immediate employer and reaches the entity that benefits from 
the laborers1 toil. 
RDG did not require T & K Steel, Inc. to furnish a 
payment bond. RDG accepted the risk that T & K Steel, Inc. 
would not be able to pay its employees their wages. T & K 
Steel failed to pay their employees and now RDG wants to shift 
the loss associated with that risk to the employees. But, the 
loss should be born by the entity that assumed the risk, by the 
entity that benefited from the laborers' efforts, by the entity 
that stands to make a profit from the sale and operation of the 
condominiums — RDG. 
RDG did not perfect its appeal by filing a cost bond 
as required by Rule 73(k) U.R.C.P. Rule 81(d) U.R.C.P. makes 
the provisions of Rule 73 U.R.C.P. applicable to appeals from 
wage claim awards of the Industrial Commission. 
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ARGUMENT 
I. THE OWNER-DEVELOPER OF LAND, WHO 
CONTRACTS WITH A BUILDER TO CONSTRUCT 
AN IMPROVEMENT ON HIS LAND, IS LIABLE 
FOR THE WAGES OF THE BUILDER'S 
EMPLOYEES IF THE BUILDER DOES NOT PAY 
THE WAGES. 
This appeal is the first opportunity the Supreme Court 
of Utah has had to determine the intent and purpose of Section 
34-28-8, Utah Code 1985-1986. The court has previously 
stated: "The best evidence of the true intent and purpose of 
the Legislature in enacting the Act is the plain language of 
the Act. The meaning of a part of an act should harmonize with 
the purpose of the whole act." Jensen v. Intermountain Health 
Care, Inc., 679 P.2d 903f 906 (Utah 1984). The "plain 
language" of Section 34-28-8 gives a laborer a cause of action 
against the person who benefits from his labor in the event his 
employer does not pay him his wages. 
The facts in this case mirror the language* of Section 
34-28-8; 
Section 34-28-8: 
"Whenever any person 
shall contract with 
another for the 
performance of work., 
Facts: 
"RDG entered into a 
contract with T & K Steel, 
Inc./ a Utah corporation, 
wherein RDG agreed to pay 
a sum certain to T & K 
Steel, Inc. in return for 
certain construction 
services to be performed on 
a parcel of real property 
located in Summit County, 
State of Utah." 
(From RDG's Petition on 
Appeal R.2, paragraph 2) 
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"... and in the event "Unfortunately, it appears 
that any wages earned that T & K Steel, Inc. did 
under the contract shall not fully pay its employees 
not be paid as required for wages earned on the 
in this act..." condominium project." 
(From RDG•s Memorandum 
R. 80) 
"... such person shall 
be civilly liable for all 
wages for work performed 
under such contract in 
the same manner as if the 
employees entitled to 
such wages were directly 
employed by such person." 
Under the circumstances presented by this appeal, the 
"plain language" of this statute protects T & K Steel's 
employees by giving them a cause of action against RDG. The 
statute is fair because RDG could have protected itself by 
overseeing the payment of wages or requiring a payment bond 
from T & K Steel, which it chose not to do. See paragraph 38 
(R. 35) of the contract between RDG and T & K Steel, Inc. RDG 
assumed the risk, it should assume the loss. 
The only other state that has had a similar statute is 
Kansas. The Supreme Court of Kansas determined the intent and 
purpose of its similar law, in a similar fact situation. In 
McGowen v. Southwestern Bell Telephone Company, 215 Kan. 887, 
529 P.2d 97 (1974) Southwestern Bell Telephone Company, a 
public utility, needed some underground telephone cable 
installed and entered into a contract with D & M Cable Company 
to perform the service. Just as in the case on appeal, before 
the completion of the project the contract was terminated. At 
the time of the contract termination, wages were due employees 
of D & M Cable Company who had worked on the project. The 
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employees made demand for their unpaid wages upon Southwestern 
Bell Telephone Company based upon the following statute: 
Whenever any such corporation shall 
contract any or all of its work to any 
contractor, then it shall become the 
duty of such corporation to provide 
that the employees of such corporation 
or contractor shall be paid according 
to the provisions of this act, and such 
corporation shall become responsible 
and liable to the employees of such 
contractor in the same manner as if 
said employees were employed by such 
corporation* McGowen, at page 98. 
At the trial court, each party filed a motion for 
summary judgment. The trial court determined that the 
employees could not recover from Southwestern Bell Telephone. 
On appeal the Supreme Court of Kansas reversed the trial court 
and found Southwestern Bell Telephone Company liable for the 
wages of D & M Cable Company employees. 
In an earlier case, Brewer v. Kansas Electric Power 
Company, 148 Kan. 434, 83 P.2d 103 (1938), Kansas Electric 
Power company operated a bus transportation system. It entered 
into a contract with Reeves and Callison, a partnership, for 
the operation and maintenance of the buses. Reeves and 
Callison hired Brewer as a mechanic to repair the buses. 
Brewer worked on the buses but was not paid his wages. Brewer 
brought an action against Kansas Electric Power Company under 
the statute cited above: G.S. 1935, 44-306. The Supreme Court 
of Kansas found Kansas Electric Power company liable for 
Brewer's wages. 
The same year that Brewer was working as a mechanic on 
Kansas Electric & Power Company's buses, 1937, the Utah State 
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Legislature enacted Section 49-9-10 (1939 Supplement to the 
Utah Revised Statutes of 1933)/ which provided: 
(a) Whenever an employer shall contract 
with another, herein called the 
subcontractor, for the performance of 
the employer's work, then it shall be 
the duty of such an employer to provide 
in such contract that the employees of 
the subcontractor shall be paid 
according to the provisions of this 
act; and in the event that such 
subcontractor shall fail to pay wages 
to his employees as specified in this 
act, such employer shall become civilly 
liable to the employees of the 
subcontractor to the extent that such 
work is performed under such contract 
in the same manner as if said employees 
were directly employed by such employer. 
(b) The provisions of paragraph (a) of this 
section shall likewise be deemed 
applicable to any person, firm, 
partnership, association or corporation 
who not being an employer, and 
hereinafter referred to in this act as 
an "indirect employer," contracts with 
a subcontractor for the performance of 
his work. (Emphasis added). 
The term "employer" was defined in Section 49-9-3(a): 
Whenever used in this act, "employer" 
includes every person, firm, 
partnership, association, corporation, 
receiver or other officer of a court of 
this state, and any agent or officer of 
any of the above mentioned classes, 
employing any person in this state. 
Section 49-9-10(b) extended liability beyond 
"employer" to an "indirect employer"; thus, any person who 
contracted with another person for work was liable for the 
earned but unpaid wages of the second person's employees. 
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In 1941, the legislature passed H.B. No. 86 which 
amended Section 49-9-10(a) and (b) to read: 
Whenever any person shall contract with 
another for the performance of work, then it 
shall be the duty of such person to provide 
in such contract that all wages earned 
pursuant to such contract shall be paid in 
accordance with the provisions of this act, 
and in the event that any wages earned under 
such contract shall not be paid as required 
in this act, such person shall be civilly 
liable for all wages for work performed 
under such contract in the same manner as if 
the employees entitled to such wages were 
directly employed by such person. Laws of 
Utah 1941, Chapter 48, page 104. (Emphasis 
added). 
In this amendment the legislature did away with the 
terms "employer" and "indirect employer" and substituted the 
words "any person" and deleted the term "subcontractor". The 
amendments did not diminish the breadth of the statute nor its 
plain intent. With the exception that the word "act" was 
changed to "chapter", the statute has remained the same since 
1941. 
There is no evidence to support the trial court's 
finding that RDG was not a licensed contractor nor regularly 
engaged in the construction business. The district judge 
modified the order (R.97-98) submitted by RDG's counsel by 
handwriting the following finding: "K.R. [Kenneth Rigtrup] 
owners of property being developed, not a licensed contractor 
or not regularly engaged in the construction business." This 
determination of the trial judge is completely without an 
evidentiary basis. This matter was presented to the trial 
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judge on cross motions for summary judgment. The parties did 
not enter into a stipulation as to the facts, nor did either 
party file supporting affidavits. The only facts before the 
court were those pled by RDG in its Petition for Trial De Novo 
(R. 2-11) and admitted by the Industrial Commission in its 
Answer (R. 52-53A); the contract between RDG and T & K Steel 
referenced in paragraph 2 of RDG's Petition for Trial De Novo 
(R. 3); and RDG's First Amended Certificate of Limited 
Partnership which was admitted into evidence as an exhibit 
(R. 86-94). 
None of the admitted facts or exhibits contain any 
evidence to support a finding that RDG was neither a "licensed 
contractor" nor "regularly engaged in the construction 
business". RDG makes such assertions in an argument set forth 
in a memorandum; but those allegations are not attested to and 
could not have been used by the court. For these reasons, the 
handwritten findings of the court are in error. 
II. THE FILING OF THE COST BOND, AS SET 
FORTH IN RULE 73(k) U.R.C.P., IS A 
NECESSARY PART OF PERFECTING AN APPEAL 
FROM AN ORDER OF THE INDUSTRIAL 
COMMISSION TO PAY WAGES. 
RDG did not file a cost bond at the time it filed its 
Notice of Appeal with the district court. The Industrial 
Commission asserted this failure as a defense in its Answer 
(R. 52); and filed a motion to dismiss the appeal based upon 
the failure of RDG to file the bond. 
Rule 73, subsections (h)-(l), U.R.C.P. govern appeals 
to district court. Rule 81(d), U.R.C.P. makes those provisions 
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applicable to appeals from orders of administrative agencies to 
district court. This has been firmly established in Utah 
Chiropractic Association v. Equitable Life Assurance Society, 
579 P.2d 1327 (Utah 1978), dealing with an appeal from the 
insurance commission, and Reagan Outdoor Advertising, Inc. v. 
Utah Department of Transportation, 589 P.2d 782 (Utah 1979), 
dealing with an appeal from the Utah Transportation Commission. 
Rule 81(d) U.R.C.P. provides: 
These Rules shall apply to the practice 
and procedure in appealing from or 
obtaining a review of any order, ruling 
or other action of an administrative 
board or agency, except in so far as 
the specific statutory procedure in 
connection with any such appeal or 
review is in conflict or inconsistent 
with these Rules. (Emphasis added). 
The Amended Order For Payment (R. 9-11) is an "order" 
of an "administrative board or agency" as those terms are used 
in Rule 81(d). 
Rule 73(k) U.R.C.P. states that an appellant to the 
district court "shall" file "at the time of filing the notice 
of appeal" a cost bond in the sum of $100.00. It provides: 
At the time of filing the notice of 
appeal, the appellant shall file with 
such notice a bond for costs on appecil 
in accordance with the provisions of 
Rule 73(c), except that the amount of 
such bond shall be $100.00. The 
appellant may likewise, under the 
conditions of Rule 62 and in accordance 
with the provisions of Rule 73, 
relating to appeals to the Supreme 
Court, obtain a stay of execution 
pending an appeal, provided, that any 
exception to th€> appellant's sureties 
shall be made in the district court to 
which the appeal is taken and 
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justification of such sureties shall be 
before the clerk or a judge of such 
court. (Emphasis added). 
The appeal was not perfected and, therefore, the 
district court did not obtain jurisdiction of this matter. 
CONCLUSION 
Section 34-28-8, Utah Code, 1985-1986, has been a 
part of this state's law for nearly 50 years. Its language is 
clear. Its purpose is obvious. The district court erred when 
it granted RDG a summary judgment. The Industrial Commission 
seeks a reversal of the district court's order granting RDG 
summary judgment; an order granting the Industrial Commission's 
motion for partial summary judgment; and a remand to the 
district court for evidence regarding the amount of the wages 
due and owing. 
With regard to the cost bond, the Industrial 
Commission seeks an order declaring that the district court 
lacked jurisdiction to hear the matter because the cost bond 
was not filed as required by Rule 73(k) U.R.C.P., or, in the 
alternative, an order directing RDG to post such a bond on 
remand. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 3{^_ day of April, 1986. 
deputy Sa^t Lake County Attorney 
Attorney for Appellant, 
Industrial Commission of Utah 
-13-
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify thcit four copies of the foregoing 
Appellant's Brief were served upon the below named party by 
depositing the same, postage pre-paid, in the United States 
mail service on the *2& "day of April, 1986, the party being: 
Michael N. Emery, 0 990 
Hansen, Jones, Maycock & Leta 
Attorneys for Respondent, RDG 
Suite 600, Valley Tower 
50 West Broadway 
Salt Lake City, Utat/ 841Q 
-14-
FILED IN CLERK'S OFFICE 
Salt Lake County Utah 
NOV 181985 
H. Dixon Hmaloy. Clerx ffi D'st. Court 
3y Ol/Q/t*irt*-&C' 
Michael N. Emery, State Bar No. 0990 
HANSEN JONES MAYCOCK <5c LETA 
Attorneys for Appellants/Employers 
50 West Broadway, Sixth Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
(801) 532-7520 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 







COMMISSION OF UTAH 
Respondent. 
ATKINSON, Eddy R., et al., 
Employees. 
ORDER DENYING 
RESPONDENTS MOTION TO 
DISMISS; DENYING 
RESPONDENTS MOTION FOR 
FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT; AND GRANTING 
PETITIONER'S MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT 





Respondent's Motion To Dismiss and Motion For Partial Summary 
Judgment, and Appellants' Motion For Summary Judgment came on for hearing 
before the court on October 28, 1985, at 2:00 p.m., the Honorable Kenneth 
Rigtrup presiding. Appellants were represented by Michael N. Emery of Hansen 
Jones Maycock & Leta, and Respondent was represented by Jay Stone of the 
Salt Lake County Attorney's Office. The court having reviewed the pleadings 
and papers on file herein, having heard the arguments and representations of 
counsel, having received, by stipulation, a copy of petitioner's Certificate of 
Limited Partnership which was marked as Exhibit 1 for purposes of all three 
consolidated cases, and having found that there is no genuine issue as to any 
CGGC97 
material fact, and that Appellants are entitled to judgment as a matter of law, 
it is hereby 
ORDERED as follows: 
2. Respondent's Motion To Dismiss is denied; 
2. Respondents Motion For Partial Summary Judgment is denied; 
3. Petitioner's Motion For Summary Judgment is hereby granted and the 
orders for payment with respect to Wage Claim Nos, 27301, 27361 and 27468, 
issued by the Industrial Commission of the State of Utah on January 25, 
March 8, and April 8, 1985, respectively, are reversed to the extent such orders 
impose liability on RDG Associates and/or Jorman Corporation, fkiA&uAX **?'*- j C L ^ ^ ^ ' ^ " * ^ 
,„,"*" A/ n^ *. *&*Z4«L r~foJ~TZs-
MADE AND ENTERED this (% -day of AvyewJfc*> fl985. 'TO- *^fc 
BY THE COURT 
»«*> t 
MAILING CERTIFICATE " </ 
I hereby certify that on this / day of November, 1985,1 caused to be 
mailed, by first-class mail, postage prepaid, a true and complete copy of the 
foregoing proposed Order to the following: 
Jay Stone, Esq. 
Salt Lake County Attorney's Office 
231 East Fourth South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 8411 
